A major requirement of conducting effective foreign policy is to understand the viewpoint of your main competitors, something that the Western elites have shown increasingly less able to do.
Thanks for this lucid and concise summary of the current state of the China vs West conflict. It is difficult to argue with the senescing technological/inventive capabilities of Germany, which is likely to see its vaunted auto industry recede as factors in the global landscape. With the Chinese reducing their appetite for luxury Eurosedans, simply status symbols, and equal disaffection for Japanese and Korean products, global market shares are now poised for startling changes.
While the US seems better positioned to compete than Europe and Japan, I’m a skeptic on the assumed easy success of resharing in semiconductor production. The word so far is setbacks in facility completion and staffing. TSMC is slowly realizing that the US intends to make an American company lead the reshoring industry (ie Intel) — even so, the jury’s out on whether these facilities, when finished, can find US staffing.
btw Mearsheimer is totally wrong about Russia and Ukraine, and a few other things. Try Kotkin instead. I am not Jewish, Kotkin likely is, but even if he were truth is not dependant on one's race or religion etc.
Unfortunately your attempt to put yourself into the shoes of the CCP, although perhaps well-intentioned, or in good-faith, is also inaccurate. You are doing a cost benefit analysis and I regret to inform you this is not how the CCP strategizes. You need to truly understand your counterparts culture, language, and ideas before being able to effectively model them. This is why so few people do it, and even fewer do that succesfully. You do at least focus on materialism, though, like Mearsheimer and literally everyone other than me, you ignore ideology. This results in a flat analysis.
I suspect your attempts at modelling other countries' elite decision making will also be flawed for similar reasons. Would prefer to be mistaken.
I am not worried about the future, nor are the CCP senior leaders, nor should the U.S. leaders. You probably have, or imagine the CCP to have, a "declinist" view of Europe and or the USA, which they really don't have.
You simply cite no party documents and barely even have a couple links to the liberal democratic Chinese "SCMP". SCMP is certainly worth reading and considering, but it also isn't People's Daily or Beijing Review.
我认为你不会阅读，也没学习马克思，毛主席。我希望我已经写错的。
Please don't be discourage and instead take it as a challenge to up your game. Learn Chinese, study Chinese ideology, read party documents. "Know your enemy, know yourself, 100 battles, 100 victories." Sun Tzu
Very enjoyable overview, thank you. I was expecting more from from China's POV viz her internal affairs, Taiwan, relations with Japan, the South China Sea, her alliance with Russia, her vision of BRICS and BRI etc. - and hopefully one day you can try to cover those aspects too! - but what you did cover was excellently done.
One question it raised in the back of the mind whilst reading through: how will multipolarity work if there are only two major manufacturing nations, China and US, and the latter is steadily falling behind and entering a period of internal turmoil likely to last decades? If China emerges as the only major manufacturing state for the RoW (assuming geopolitical bifurcation continues), then what will multipolarity really look like? It seems like there is going to be one Giant and many much smaller nations, with the possible exception of Russia which is geographically huge and a source of almost limitless natural resources. Am not saying this is necessarily bad, but it is not often talked about that way.
Like previous empires, the US Empire with its Western vassals will resist their decline while also exacerbating it for as long as they can. I see China following a tributary type system, with the acceptance of China as the "middle kingdom" but without any drive to force others to mimic the Chinese model. It much better matches its history and its geographic reality.
China may well become the dominant power, but it may not practice the neo-colonial domination and violence of the West. We see this with China's relationship with ASEAN, MENA and South America. There will still be the tighter alliances of BRINCISSTAN (Belarus, Russia, Iran, North Korea, China, Iraq, Syria and the Stans) that forms the offsetting military and resource power to the West.
I am not very optimistic about India, so don't see that country growing to be anything other than a regional power in a region dominated by China, Russia and Iran.
Thanks for this lucid and concise summary of the current state of the China vs West conflict. It is difficult to argue with the senescing technological/inventive capabilities of Germany, which is likely to see its vaunted auto industry recede as factors in the global landscape. With the Chinese reducing their appetite for luxury Eurosedans, simply status symbols, and equal disaffection for Japanese and Korean products, global market shares are now poised for startling changes.
While the US seems better positioned to compete than Europe and Japan, I’m a skeptic on the assumed easy success of resharing in semiconductor production. The word so far is setbacks in facility completion and staffing. TSMC is slowly realizing that the US intends to make an American company lead the reshoring industry (ie Intel) — even so, the jury’s out on whether these facilities, when finished, can find US staffing.
btw Mearsheimer is totally wrong about Russia and Ukraine, and a few other things. Try Kotkin instead. I am not Jewish, Kotkin likely is, but even if he were truth is not dependant on one's race or religion etc.
Unfortunately your attempt to put yourself into the shoes of the CCP, although perhaps well-intentioned, or in good-faith, is also inaccurate. You are doing a cost benefit analysis and I regret to inform you this is not how the CCP strategizes. You need to truly understand your counterparts culture, language, and ideas before being able to effectively model them. This is why so few people do it, and even fewer do that succesfully. You do at least focus on materialism, though, like Mearsheimer and literally everyone other than me, you ignore ideology. This results in a flat analysis.
I suspect your attempts at modelling other countries' elite decision making will also be flawed for similar reasons. Would prefer to be mistaken.
I am not worried about the future, nor are the CCP senior leaders, nor should the U.S. leaders. You probably have, or imagine the CCP to have, a "declinist" view of Europe and or the USA, which they really don't have.
You simply cite no party documents and barely even have a couple links to the liberal democratic Chinese "SCMP". SCMP is certainly worth reading and considering, but it also isn't People's Daily or Beijing Review.
我认为你不会阅读，也没学习马克思，毛主席。我希望我已经写错的。
Please don't be discourage and instead take it as a challenge to up your game. Learn Chinese, study Chinese ideology, read party documents. "Know your enemy, know yourself, 100 battles, 100 victories." Sun Tzu
Very enjoyable overview, thank you. I was expecting more from from China's POV viz her internal affairs, Taiwan, relations with Japan, the South China Sea, her alliance with Russia, her vision of BRICS and BRI etc. - and hopefully one day you can try to cover those aspects too! - but what you did cover was excellently done.
One question it raised in the back of the mind whilst reading through: how will multipolarity work if there are only two major manufacturing nations, China and US, and the latter is steadily falling behind and entering a period of internal turmoil likely to last decades? If China emerges as the only major manufacturing state for the RoW (assuming geopolitical bifurcation continues), then what will multipolarity really look like? It seems like there is going to be one Giant and many much smaller nations, with the possible exception of Russia which is geographically huge and a source of almost limitless natural resources. Am not saying this is necessarily bad, but it is not often talked about that way.
Like previous empires, the US Empire with its Western vassals will resist their decline while also exacerbating it for as long as they can. I see China following a tributary type system, with the acceptance of China as the "middle kingdom" but without any drive to force others to mimic the Chinese model. It much better matches its history and its geographic reality.
China may well become the dominant power, but it may not practice the neo-colonial domination and violence of the West. We see this with China's relationship with ASEAN, MENA and South America. There will still be the tighter alliances of BRINCISSTAN (Belarus, Russia, Iran, North Korea, China, Iraq, Syria and the Stans) that forms the offsetting military and resource power to the West.
I am not very optimistic about India, so don't see that country growing to be anything other than a regional power in a region dominated by China, Russia and Iran.