Ukraine Update

September

It’s now late September and time to take stock of the progress of the Russian army along the main lines of attack, especially with the Alaska summit now turning out to have been more performative than productive.

Ukraine manpower situation gets even worse

Due to the level of internal unrest within Ukraine, Zelensky decided to allow 18-22 year old men to leave the country to reduce the pressure for change in the short-term. Nearly immediately, large numbers of such men could be seen crossing the border.

State Border Guard Service spokesman Andrey Demchenko said that young people had already begun departing after the travel ban was lifted. Large numbers were reportedly heading toward the borders with Poland and Hungary, causing traffic jams that have been widely publicized on social media. He confirmed that the first applicants had already completed the necessary paperwork at checkpoints and left the country.

With so many men at the front, dead or disabled, the younger age group had become the backbone of the male non-military workforce. With parents already taking their under 18-year old sons abroad en masse and now with the 18-22 year olds added the result will be severe manpower shortages in the Ukrainian economy. As well as draining the reserve of future possible recruits and press-ganged. In response, Ukraine made people over 60 eligible for service in the armed forces; such individuals will be more of a burden than a benefit in such a conflict.

The Ukrainian army is experiencing about 45,000 to 50,000 casualties every month, together with hundreds of thousands that have deserted their positions and gone AWOL. With very few of them being replaced, and the press-ganging of unwilling recruits becoming more and more desperate. You will not see the things in the video below in the Western media.

The resulting reductions in front line strength can be seen in the increasing inability of the Ukrainian military to mount any more than localized counter-attacks. And even then, such attacks require the weakening of other areas of the front as the Ukrainian army has no free reserve units left. A good example is the redeployment of the 3rd Assault Brigade from the area west of Lozova where it had spent many months launching counter-attack after counter-attack against the Russian forces. That the Ukrainians had to redeploy this already exhausted unit to try to hold back the Russian forces in Kupyansk is indicative of the manpower shortages of the Ukrainian military.

As Larry Johnson notes “Dead Bodies Don’t Lie”:

Since January 1, 2025, Ukraine has received the bodies of 9,365 Ukrainian soldiers while Russia has received an estimated deceased soldiers. In other words, for every dead Russian serviceman there are 39 dead Ukrainian soldiers. This represents nine months of data, so we are not dealing with a one-time aberration.

Johnson points out the delusional statements of Trump’s main Russia point man, Keith Kellogg, such as when he stated that Russia has over a million dead and wounded. Mirroring the many such statements of massive Russian casualty levels by European leaders. Even accounting for the fact that the Russians are advancing and will therefore tend to recover more Ukrainian dead than the Ukrainians recover Russian dead, the ratio is still indicative of an incredibly one sided level of losses on the Ukrainian side. Which would be expected given the colossal Russian advantages in pretty much every aspect of the war. Those increasing advantages are also resulting in a continual fall in Russian casualties, as reported by Mediazona. Only 54,000 deaths recorded in the first eight months of the year, even using the more expansive probate registry estimate.

The war has now been going on for 43 months, so total Ukrainian deaths of over 1 million are very likely. Then add to that the irretrievably physically and mentally disabled, together with hundreds of thousands of deserters and a number above 2 million is quite likely.

The official Ukrainian demographic information is utterly bogus as it does not reflect even the pre-war mass migrations of the young abroad to find work and better life chances. The official number for Ukrainian controlled territories is 36.7 million. The IMF estimate of 33.4 million, still a massive over-estimation. The actual population within the Ukrainian controlled areas is probably below 20 million, heavily skewed toward the old and infirm. A male population between 25 and 60 of about 4 million capable of military service seems about right, taking existing disabilities, over 2 million dead, newly disabled, MIA and AWOL, at least a million serving in the armed services / security services / support services and a still remaining population with reserved occupations. This matches with the desperate press-gang tactics being used to find and forcibly conscript anyone eligible for military services, the opening of military service to those over 60, and the increasing number of women at the front. We are also seeing a more and more diverse group of mercenaries as Ukraine scans the globe for warm bodies to throw into the meat grinder. Also with the observed workforce impacts of the 18-22 year-old age group being allowed to leave Ukraine. Ukraine is being bled dry, and the population will now drop further with the 18-22 year old population being allowed to leave.

The critical Ukrainian shortage of manpower is forcing them to use highly skilled specialists such as aircraft technicians and drone operators as front line troops, stripping away critical parts of the rear areas. This from Southfront:

The crisis on the front line has forced the Ukrainian Armed Forces to transfer aviation technicians to assault units in order to compensate for losses in the infantry. This decision has been officially confirmed by the General Staff and highlights the acute shortage of personnel, exacerbated by low motivation and desertion. Meanwhile, specialists trained abroad to work on F-16 equipment are not being deployed to the infantry.

European governments are now winding down social support programs for Ukrainian refugees in an attempt to encourage them to return home, including the large numbers of able-bodied military age men. Given that the latter very much understand their fate if they return home, the removal of social support will more add recruits to the Ukrainian criminal element in Europe than provide new recruits for the Ukrainian military. With respect to the women, it may lead to an increase in the ranks of prostitutes and those striving for relationships and marriages of economic convenience.

Extended Russian Drone “Kill Zones”

As the video below covers, Russia is developing a much longer range drone capability to interdict the Ukrainian military at up to 45km from the front line. This is through the development of longer range FPV drones and mothership drones that can carry FPV drones deeper into enemy territory. The pace of development of drone technology is very much in parallel to that of military aircraft during WW1, and Russia is excelling at driving new developments and then industrializing and mass producing those developments.

As this Russian capability grows, the logistics of the Ukrainian forces up to 45km from the front line will be severely interdicted. Together with strikes on fixed logistics points, such as bridges and railway stations, this promises to severely reduce the ability of the Ukrainians to resupply and reinforce their front line positions.

For many weeks now there have been no reported destructions of Ukrainian armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs), infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) or even the out of date tracked coffin armoured personnel carriers (APCs), and the losses of Ukrainian Light Armoured Vehicles (LAVs) have fallen rapidly. This points to a widespread lack of tracked vehicles, and even the generally wheeled LAVs. In contrast, the Russian army is recording the destruction of many hundreds of civilian-style motor vehicles each week.

The lack of tracked and armoured vehicles will be reducing the Ukrainian armies logistical capabilities just as Russia is establishing drone killing fields up to 45km from the front. This will worsen again in about a month as the season of mud arrives to force all wheeled vehicles onto the limited number of paved roads, providing a concentration of the limited logistical targets for the Russian drones. Increasing drone sensor capabilities, such as thermal and low light cameras, can make the night just as dangerous as the day.

Sumy

• Take Sumy

This area of the front has now been relatively stable for months, with its role now seeming to be to tie down Ukrainian troops and attrit them rather than as an active front. The Russian focus has been on other fronts. This may change if the Ukrainian army is forced to move manpower elsewhere to fill other holes in the front created by the Russians.

Kupyansk

• Taking Kupyansk to cut off the Ukrainian troops east of the Oskol between Kupyansk and Kolisnykivka (about 14km). IN THE CENTRE OF KUPYANSK

• Connecting the Russian troops in Kupyansk, Vovchans’k, and Mylove (aka Melovoye) cutting off all positions contained by Kupyansk, Prymorske and Vovchans’k. VOVCHANSK AND MYLOVE BRIDGEHEADS BEING EXPANDED

This area has remained the one with the slowest progress, with the Russian forces now grinding their way through Kupyansk after they dealt with numerous Ukrainian counter-attacks. As noted above, the Ukrainians are redeploying even exhausted units from other areas of the front in a desperate attempt top hold back the Russians; who are now within sight of the main Oskil river crossing in Kupyansk and control two thirds of the buildings in the city. The Ukrainians are being slowly and progressively squeezed out, and (not shown on the above map) the Russians are working on flanking the core fortified area in the centre through an advance just west of the main north-south road; to cut both supply routes into the city.

The fall of Kupyansk will fundamentally change the dynamics of this area of the front, as it will cut off the Ukrainian troops east of the Oskol in a northern pocket which would then be collapsed. Kupyansk itself will provide a major logistics hub to the Russian forces from which they can drive north, south and east. The clearing of the pocket east of the Oskil will also free up the Russian forces to drive southwards from Kruhlyakivka to Borova, Lozova (the drive from the east toward Lozova has recently been restarted) and Izyum.

We are also seeing increased activity in Vovchansk and an expansion of the bridgehead around Milove (aka Melovoye), which threatens the envelopment of the area enclosed by Vovchansk, Pechenihy, Kupyansk and Varavarivka. This would significantly improve the Russian army’s logistics, with two roads from Russia combining at what would become the logistics hub of Prykolotne. It would also open up yet another hole requiring Ukrainian troops to plug; troops that the Ukrainians don’t have. The Russians would be only 25km from Kharkov, and just over 10km from the M03 between Kharkov and Izyum, and 25km from cutting the lesser regional P78 road; the main supply roads into Izyum and the west bank of the Oskil.

Lyman-Siversk

• Take Lozove to cut off the Ukrainian troops east of the Oskol between Lozove and Bohuslavka (about 17km), with only the bridge at Horokhovatka left to supply them; a bridge that will be destroyed any time it becomes functional. WITHIN 5 KM OF ROAD TO LOZOVE

• Take Lyman and/or Yampil to cut off all of the supply routes to Siversk RUSSIAN TROOPS ENTERED YAMPIL, 3KM TO LYMAN

• Take Siversk to collapse the front that is centred on it. RUSSIAN TROOPS HAVE ENTERED THE TOWN

North of Siversk

The Russians taking of Srednee (aka Serednje) and advance toward Korovii Yar puts them within 5km of the road that goes through Lozove which supplies the Ukrainian forces further north, east of the Oskil River. That would make those forces totally reliant on the only bridge at Horokhovatka, which we can assume will be attacked any time it becomes functional.

With the taking of the Serebryanka forest, Tors’ke, and Zarichne (6km northeast of Lyman) major progress has been achieved. To the northwest of Lyman, Shandryholove has been taken and the Russian forces are now entering Drobysheve (3 km from Lyman). Russian troops are directly storming Yampil, just south of which is the remaining main supply route for Siversk. The Russians are also advancing from the south, taking Pereizne (aka Pereezdnoe) and Kuzmynivka (not shown on the above map) and now entering Zvanivka; only 3km away from Siversk from the south. The Russian military have also stated that Russian troops have entered Siversk from the north.

The taking of any of Lyman, Yampil or Siversk would create much greater fluidity in an area that has been akin to WW1 for a couple of years. And create yet another hole for the Ukrainians to plug.

Kostyantynivka / Kramatorsk / Solvyansk

• Advance northwards to the west of Kostyantynivka to Osykove to cut the H20 (envelopment from south west) MOVE NORTH WEST OF KUPYANSK STALLED BY A MAJOR MOVE OF UKRAINIAN FORCES TO THE AREA

• Advance west from the north of Chasiv Yar to Maiske & Markove, then flank the deep emplacements by advancing to Osykove and Druzhkivka to cut the H20 (envelopment from north east) MAISKE TAKEN

• Close the pocket between Toretsk and Yablunivka DONE

• Take the area between Dachne (northeast of Toretsk) and Predtechyne (east of Kostyantynivka) as that will enclose a heavily fortified area and threaten Kostyantynivka from the east and south east. It would also bring the T0516, that supplies the Ukrainian troops between Kostyantynivka and Kleban-Byk, under Russian fire control. DONE, RUSSIAN FORCES WITHIN 1 KM OF T0516 AND 3KM OF THE H20 THAT SUPPLIES UKRAINIAN FORCES TO THE SOUTHWEST OF KOSTYANTYNIVKA.

• Move north from above pocket toward the southern outskirts of Kostyantynivka and storm the town. RUSSIAN FORCES IN THE SOUTHWESTERN OUTSKIRTS OF THE TOWN.

• Advance to the west of Kramatorsk to sever the supply lines between it and everything to the west (T0514 and T0510), which will greatly aid a northwards advance from the Pokrovsk area. STALLED, SEE ABOVE.

• Take Izyum to then completely cut off the Kramatorsk/Slovyansk agglomeration from the north. FUTURE OBJECTIVE.

  

The large push northwards from northwest of Pokrovsk was successfully stalled by significant Ukrainian reinforcements. Maiske (aka Mayskoye) to the northwest of Cashov Yar taken, and advance to the outskirts of Markove (aka Markovo); some mapper says that Markove has already been taken..

The area between Chasov Yar and Tortesk fronts connected with the closing of the fortified area in between them. Russians are in the southeastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka and within 1km of the T0516 and 3km of the H20, threatening to cut off all of the Ukrainian forces southeast, south and southwest of Kostyantynivka. This would lead to a substantial collapse of the front and the advance of Russian troops to Kostyantynivka from many directions.

The hardest part will be the taking of Izyum given the Ukrainian focus on the northern fronts, and the obvious strategic disaster that the loss of Izyum would be for the Ukrainians. Perhaps after a couple of more months of depleting the Ukrainian army, its logistics chains and its economic infrastructure, it may be time for the Russians to launch an overwhelming offensive in this area to cover the 20km to Izyum. Especially if the Ukrainians are forced to redirect even more forces toward Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk and Pokrovs’ke (see below), and perhaps after the taking of Lyman, Yampil and Siversk.

Pokrovsk

• Attack on the northeastern flank, taking Razine and advancing to outskirts of Myrnohrad: DONE

• Cut the northern supply roads roads between Pokrovsk and Kostyantynivka: UNDER RUSSIAN FIRE CONTROL

• Advance to Hryshyne on the high ground north west of Pokrovsk, cut the last supply road of the E50: STALLED DUE TO UKRAINIAN REINFORCEMENTS

North East of Pokrovsk

After overcoming the extra Ukrainian forces within Pokrovsk, the Russians are now storming the west/northwest of the town to take the junctions of the E50 and 00525 roads with the T0504 going east; cutting the remaining major supply lines (the above map of Pokrovsk is a little outdated). West to East traffic would then have to be redirected to the many times smaller Olympiys’ka road from Hryshyne to the north-south T0515 south of Rodyns’ke, but that small road would then be the focus of Russian drone attacks and the T0515 is very exposed to Russian fire. So, even with this redirection the Ukrainian logistics would be severely impacted and that could lead to the collapse of the defences in Pokrovsk and Mirnograd. The Russians are also storming the southeast of the town to create an encirclement of the high rise “citadel” area.

The advances north/north east of Pokrovsk have been successfully stalled by the Ukrainians, at the cost of transferring significant elements from other areas of the front. The Ukrainians are now attempting to cut off the “bulge” of the Russian north of Bokivka. At best, this will delay the Russians, at worst it will lead to the loss of large numbers of elite troops and vehicles. The Russian army is working to cut off the relatively narrow Ukrainian incursions into their lines. We can assume a merciless drone, artillery, helicopter and fixed wing aircraft bombardment of the Ukrainian troops.

The report from Weeb Union below shows that the Russians have restarted their offensive to the east and north east of Pokrovsk, reaching the outskirts of Mirnograd and have now cut the supply lines to one of the two Ukrainian incursions. Once again, it looks like the Russians have caught the Ukrainian army in a trap that is leading to large losses of soldiers and equipment.

A fall of the Pokrovsk agglomeration could well lead to accelerated Russian advances into an operational space with few emplacements and only relatively small towns. The morale of the Ukrainian army would have been severely reduced, and its logistics significantly impacted. Russia will have the Pokrovsk area as an important staging and supply area for ongoing offensives. That is why the town, and its environs, have turned into an irresistible meat grinder for the Ukrainian forces.

The Southern Front

• Take Novopavlovka to protect northern flank and gain access to less fortified areas to the west. WITHIN 2km.

• Take Pokrovs’ke to cut the T0401 from the north. RUSSIAN FORCES WITHIN 14KM.

• Take Hulyaipole to cut the T0401 from the south. RUSSIAN FORCES WITHIN 14KM

• Take Novomykolaivka to cut the T0408 from the north.

• Take Orikhiv to cut the T0408 from the south.

• Advance to the south and west of Zaporizhzhia to cut the T0803 and N15 from the west. RUSSIANS STORMING STEPNOHIRS’K and PRYMORSK

The taking of Muravka to the northeast of Novopavlovka, together with the retaking of Andriivka-Kletsove and Zelenyi Hai to its south, and then the storming of Ivanivka that threatens to cut off the western supply route to the town, are part of a slow developing envelopment of Novopavlivka. The forces in Muravka are only 6km from the remaining northern supply route of the T0428, which means that we can assume that it is already under heavy drone attack.

The Russian forces have also advanced to within 3km of the T0428 south of Novopavlivka, threatening to cut off the Ukrainian forces that have been counter-attacking Dachne for months. This will allow the Russians to use the T0428 as a supply route for attacking Novopavlivka from the south.

The southeastern front is seeing nearly daily advances as the Russians take one village/town after another, outflanking the Ukrainian defensive lines to the north and south. The focus seems to be more in the south toward Hulyaipole (where the defensive lines to its south are too strong to directly attack) with the move south of Velykomykhailivka holding for now. The Pryvilne/Pavlivka/Upsenivka/Novovasylivske/Novomykolaivka agglomeration is the remaining hurdle to cross before the Russians can advance on Hulyaipole from the northeast, behind the Ukrainian south and east facing defence lines. How much longer can the Ukrainians allow daily advances here before they have to attempt to reinforce this front?

The same issue of fortifications has halted further advances from Malynivka toward Hulyaipole and from Mala Tomachka toward Orikhiv. The storming of Stephohirs’k and Prymorsk (less than 15km from Zaprorizhzhia) is in progress. The taking of Hulyaipole will provide the Russians with a much needed logistics hub that can support drives westward to continue to outflank the Ukrainian defences from the north.

The Europeans continue to lose their minds

Trump has pretty much moved support for Ukraine to a Europe that does not have the resources to fill the hole left by the US. At the same time, with his recent maneuverings, he has removed the US from further obligations to use secondary sanctions to block Russian fossil fuel sales.

The European oligarchies cannot accept that they will lose the Ukrainian War, and faced with the reality of that eventual loss are left in a state of severe angst and desperate denial. Knowing that their forces will be treated as legitimate military targets, and attacked, if they enter Ukraine.

While the leaderships of the UK, France and Germany suffering historically low approval levels, France faced with both a constitutional and fiscal crisis, and economic growth hovering around stall speed. With massively sanctioned Russia still growing faster, and China growing at a steady 5% per annum. The opening of the Ukrainian border to those 22 years old and below by Zelensky only deepened the European anger, as it allows so many to escape the fate of imperial proxy cannon fodder.

The Western oligarchs and their courtiers are desperately attempting to ramp up the unfounded fear of Russia, with an obviously Ukraine false flag drone incursion into Poland and Russian aircraft flying in international airspace being falsely accused of breaching Estonian airspace. We can expect a continuous stream of such propagandist games.

Moldova Election

After the stealing of the Romanian election, the EU and NATO are now faced with another election that may need fixing or even something beyond that. In Moldova there will be parliamentary elections on September 28th, and the Western vassal Sandu’s coalition looks like it could lose even with a fair degree of election rigging. Sandu’s government has already played the “Russia, Russia, Russia” card in an authoritarian crackdown prior to the election, including banning one opposition party and critical media outlet after another. We can also expect the usual disenfranchisement of the vast majority of the 300,000 Moldovans living in Russia. Everything possible will be done to get in the votes of Moldovans in the EU, with a huge amount of polling stations made available; with the possibility of ballot stuffing and “voting often” made easier. As was done during the recent presidential elections that were fixed to get Sandu elected. This is “democracy” in the famous European “garden”.

But not even that may be enough, and the opposition may win the legislature; effectively tying Sandu’s corrupt Western vassal hands. Perhaps even an impeachment of Sandu for the extensive wrongdoings of her administration. Such an outcome cannot be allowed for such a front line state and we now see more and more reports of possible NATO state intervention. It will all be blamed on “Russian interference” as a state of emergency is declared and Sandu follows the Zelensky path to dictatorship. The West only likes democracy when it serves its interests. Such a takeover would also serve the European elite’s desperate need to flex their atrophied muscles, by attacking the Russian enclave of Transnistria before Russian forces can link up with them; placing NATO forces closer to Odessa.

An accumulation of stressors leading to collapse

The Russians are attriting the Ukrainian forces by about 50,000 casualties each month, have massively stepped up the attacks on the Ukrainian infrastructure supporting the war effort, and are opening one new hole after another in the front that the Ukrainians need to plug. With no reserves, and even no relatively rested units, this means that plugging one hole simply leads to the unplugging of another; with more and more holes appearing. Opposite Donetsk, the Russians are also very close to entering an operational space of limited Ukrainian fortifications and a flat topography; both of which will provide advantage to the attacking Russian forces. While the US has pulled its support, and the Ukrainians are now dependent on the lesser European resources. A recipe for a cascading collapse, only mitigated by the still restrictive drone capabilities; but the Russians are building an overwhelming advantage even in that area.