Of Sovereigns, Nobles and Vassals: The Western Way of Hierarchy
In the sphere of mainstream international relations (IR) scholarship there is a completely artificial discontinuity agreed to be situated in 1648, when the Treaty of Westphalia was signed. The assumption is that that was when “modern” states replaced those of feudal times in Western Europe. This is of course utterly ridiculous as France was still an absolutist monarchy, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire came into existence in 1867, among many exceptions to the “modern” rule. As Bruno Teschke (2003) correctly details, international relations were still rooted in feudalism and hierarchy. Mainstream IR realist thinking also considers that in the modern-day relationships between states are carried out in an “anarchic” system with little or no hierarchy, while liberal internationalists believe that through “capitalist democracy” (whatever the US elites deem that to be) nations can peacefully co-exist without a global sovereign. These are both of course, complete rubbish for anyone who spends any time to notice how international relations actually work.
Hobson and Sharman (2005) see a continuation of medieval hierarchical relationships existing within the mainstream-IR assumed anarchic international system. As they put it (Ibid., p. 69):
despite their many substantial differences, nevertheless realists, liberal institutionalists and constructivists alike conceive of sovereignty as producing relations between political units in the international system in which ‘none is entitled to command; none is required to obey’ (Waltz, 1979: 88). Hierarchical authority means exactly the opposite — that some are entitled to command and some are required to obey, and that both sides recognize as legitimate the social logic of this unequal situation.
Hierarchy and anarchy (no overall sovereign authority) exist together, although after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the liberalization of China the US elites may have believed that they were becoming the global sovereign authority. To the disappointment of the US elites, they remain as only the sovereign of their part of the world, or as they put “the leader of the free world”. Within this “free world” there still exist nobles and vassals; just like in earlier periods.
Prior to the Soviet collapse the nobles who promised fealty to the US sovereign included Western Europe, the UK, Japan and the other white settler colonies (Australia, New Zealand and Canada), Turkey, Greece, and Scandinavia. Nobles are allowed differing levels of autonomy but must not go against US interests, and must accept a certain level of insulting oversight and interference – such as revelations of US spying on politicians, misuse of extra-territorial US laws to favor US corporations, and sanctions that damage the European economy (e.g. against Russia and Iran). There is a limit to such behavior though, as otherwise the nobles will become unhappy and start to wistfully consider life away from the dominance of the sovereign.
Central and Southern America were US vassals (the US “Monroe Doctrine”), with Africa shared between Western Europe (esp. France) and the US (with some contestation from the Soviet Union), and a Middle East full of US vassals (taken over from the British), and South Korea was also a US vassal (its own army commanded by a US general). Vassals have much less autonomy than nobles, and usually have significant comprador elites that understand that their primary role is to benefit the US not their nation’s citizens. Electoral or revolutionary protests against that state of affairs are forcefully put down, as with the series of military coups in Central and South America and Africa in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. The attempted coup in Venezuela in 2002 is a notable recent example of a comprador elite (fully supported by the US) trying to remove a nationalist government (the recent coups in Honduras and Bolivia being somewhat more successful examples). The US invasion of Panama in 1989 is a very rare case in recent years where the US had to actually intervene directly.
Many states tried to gang together to offset US and Western dominance, through the non-aligned movement which proposed a New International Economic Order (NIEO), but this was beaten back in the 1980s. Iran was one of the few that escaped, through a revolution that overthrew a US vassal dictator in 1979; repeating the experience of China in 1949. Any such nation is automatically seen as an enemy to be isolated and quashed by the US sovereign.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the Baltic States were added to the list of nobles and/or vassals, including the Western supported breakup of Yugoslavia. Russia wanted to become a senior noble (Braw 2022) but the US viewed it as a failed enemy to be consigned to the role of vassal. Cohen (2018), an expert on Russia not blinded by ideology, viewed the US treatment of Russia during this period as one of its great foreign policy blunders. Instead of a noble that would side with it against the challenger China, the US got an enemy engaged in a deepening alliance with China (and Iran). China managed to utilize the “free world” to its benefit for three decades while not coming under the dominance of the US, until it became too powerful a nation to ignore and its leader decided to stop keeping a low profile.
In recent years, South East Asian nations (including of course Vietnam and Laos) have exerted greater autonomy as their economies have become more dependent upon China than the US. The recent inability of the US to get the support of the ASEAN (Association of South East Nation) nations to support it against China is indicative of their independent status. The same can be said for Central Asia, especially after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the very recent failed coup in Kazakhstan. China has also been extremely successful in making inroads into Africa, greatly reducing US (and Western European) relative power there; notwithstanding the Western regime change operation in Libya.
The “non-West” seem to be displaying a very different form of hierarchy. China and Russia can be seen as equal partners, although as China continues to outgrow Russia the latter may become a more and more junior partner. Given Russia’s benefit to China in protecting its northern border, providing military support and technology (for now), fossil fuel and other resources, and diplomatic influence in Central Asia and with India, it can be assumed that China will be extremely respectful and supportive of this alliance. For all other nations China currently practices respect for both national sovereignty and national prestige, providing a significant competitive advantage with respect to a US approach of “you are my noble or vassal or you are my enemy”. China’s approach can be said to mirror somewhat the Tributary relationships of earlier Chinese foreign relations, but it can also be seen as an intelligent tactic that suits China’s current position vis a vis the US and the West. Its own history of colonization and revolution, together with its incredibly successful development drive, does lend a high degree of credibility to its approach with other nations.
The march of the Russia/China/Iran deepening alliance (which includes Mongolia, North Korea, Central Asia, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria and Belarus) through the US and Western vassals, when combined with the studied neutrality of the ASEAN nations and the continued rapid growth of China, is bringing the US elites to a stark choice. They have to either fight a multi-faceted aggressive campaign designed to restrain the influence of the alliance, or they must come to terms with it. The current actions of the US show a high proclivity for the former position, but one that is constrained by its own nobles and its over-extension as it keeps adding enemies rather than coming to terms with lesser challengers (e.g. Iran and Russia). The geopolitical game is now moving into the final rounds, as the US nobles start to become problematic as they are asked to make sacrifices that will be extremely painful.
The greatest mistake that can be made by a sovereign is to push its nobles too hard after losing a number of battles (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, failed sanctions against Russia, failed tariffs against China). The sovereign then looks both weak and overbearing at the same time, especially to the strongest nobles. Noble unhappiness and pushback can be seen with respect to a Germany that would be deeply damaged by further aggressive moves against Russia, after having already seen significant damage from previous sanctions. The fact that Russia has managed to weather these sanctions and even use them to develop its own substitutes can only add to German unhappiness. Germany’s car and other manufacturing industries are also heavily dependent on sales to China, for example about 30% of the sales of German car manufacturers are in China; the biggest global car market and one that is still growing in contrast to European and US markets. The French noble can also not have been impressed by the dirty dealing through which it recently lost a submarine deal with Australia to the US, nor by the sight of booming Russian cheese and wine industries. In addition, no matter how much the US blathers on about “freedom molecules” Europe cannot do without Russian gas.
It seems that the sovereign is only just waking up to the limiting need to keep its nobles onside, otherwise it may find the two leading nations of Europe starting to resemble the nations of ASEAN in their unreadiness to align with US interests. The refusal of Germany to countenance NATO arming of the Ukraine, or to even allow arms flights over its territory, is a straw in the wind. The full commissioning of the Nordstream 2 natural gas pipeline will be another. The US seems to be desperately looking to provoke Russia into an action that will unite its nobles with it, but the Russians seem to understand that time is on their side. The same can be said with the US attempts to provoke China with respect to its wayward province. The angst of the US elites comes from the realization that they are in a lose a little or lose a lot position, while experiencing extreme intestinal discomfort with the first option. The longer they wait the bigger the “little” loss will be and the greater the possibility of a senior noble revolt.
References
Braw, E, (2022, Jan 19). When Putin Loved NATO. Foreign Policy.
Cohen, S. F. (2018). War with Russia? Hot Books.
Hobson, J. M., & Sharman, J.C. (2005). The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics: Tracing the Social Logics of Hierarchy and Political Change. European Journal of International Relations 11(1): 63–98.
Teschke, B. (2003). The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern International Relations. Verso.